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TREATING QUASI-COMMUNITY PROPERTY AS
COMMUNITY PROPERTY FOR DEBT COLLECTION:
DUE PROCESS AND POLICY CONCERNS*
I. INTRODUCTION
The community property system in California is in the process
of continuing growth and definition. Since the early part of this cen-
tury, the California Legislature has attempted to solve some of the
system's problems. One of the main stumbling blocks which has con-
tinuously troubled the Legislature is the classification and liability of
property acquired by a married couple outside California which they
bring with them when moving to California.
In the past this property has been considered the separate prop-
erty of the title-holding spouse. Classification as separate property
had shielded it from liability for community debts. However, in 1984
the California Legislature enacted two statutes which changed the
traditional classification of property acquired by a married couple
outside of California. California Civil Code sections 5120.020 and
5120.1201 treat this separate property as community property for the
purposes of liability for debts.
Prior to 1984, property brought into California, acquired in a
common law state, was given the label quasi-community property.S
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1. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 5120.020, 5120.120 (West Supp. 1988).
CAL. CiV. CODE § 5120.020 provides: "'Community property' includes: a) Real Property
situated in another state that would be community property if situated in this state. b) Quasi-
community property."
CAL. CIv. CODE § 5120.120 provides: "For the purposes of this chapter, quasi-commu-
nity property is liable to the same extent, and shall be treated the same in all other respects, as
community property."
2. Quasi-community property is defined by CAL. CIV. CODE § 4803 (West 1983). It
provides:
As used in this part, "quasi-community property" means all real or personal
property wherever situated, heretofore or hereafter acquired in any of the fol-
lowing ways:
(a) By either spouse while domiciled elsewhere which would have been
community property if the spouse who acquired the property had been domi-
ciled in this state at the time of its acquisition.
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It was treated as separate rather than community property.8 There
were only two narrow exceptions to this rule: death of the title-hold-
ing spouse and dissolution of the marriage."
Under the new statutory scheme, quasi-community property is
treated the same as community property for the purpose of collecting
debt, thereby making it liable for community debts. It seems clear
that there are severe due process and policy problems presented by
these statutes.
To justify this reallocation of property rights under California
law, the Legislature must identify a sufficient state interest and
demonstrate that the disturbance of a vested property right is neces-
sary to achieve the state's interest. As will be shown below, the state
cannot meet this burden.5
(b) In exchange for real or personal property, wherever situated, which
would have been community property if the spouse who acquired the property
so exchanged had been domiciled in this state at the time of its acquisition.
3. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1988) defines community property as "all real
property situated in this state and all personal property wherever situated acquired during the
marriage by a married person while domiciled in this state, and property held in trust pursu-
ant to Section 5110.150 is community property."
4. Section 4800 of the Civil Code defines the method of dividing property at dissolution.
It provides that the "community estate" shall be divided equally between the spouses. Section
4800(a) defines "community estate" to include both the community and quasi-community as-
sets and liabilities of the parties.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800(a) (West 1988) provides:
(a) Except upon the written agreement of the parties, or on oral stipulation of
the parties in open court, the court shall, either in its interlocutory judgment of
dissolution of the marriage, in its judgment decreeing the legal separation of the
parties, or at a later time if it expressly reserves jurisdiction to make such a
property division, divide the community property and the quasi-community
property of the parties equally. For purposes of making this division, the court
shall value the assets and liabilities as near as practicable to the time of trial,
except that, upon 30 days' notice by the moving party to the other party, the
court for good cause shown may value all or any portion of the assets and liabil-
ities at a date after separation and prior to trial to accomplish an equal division
of the community estate and the quasi-community property of the parties in an
equitable manner.
For the purposes of division and in confirming or assigning the liabilities of the
parties for which the community estate is liable, the court shall characterize
liabilities as separate or community and confirm or assign them to the parties in
accordance with subdivision (c).
CAL. PROB. CODE § 101 defines the same equal division in the case of death of the title-
holding spouse.
5. See infra section III.
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
II. BACKGROUND: HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF QUASI-
COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND ITS EFFECT ON SECTION 5120.120
A. Past California Statutes and Case Law
In 1917, the California Legislature enacted Civil Code section
164 which provided that property acquired in a common law state
converted into community property when the married couple estab-
lished a domicile in California.' This was the first attempt to divest
a spouse of a vested property right in what was later to be called
quasi-community property. However, the California Supreme Court
in In re Thornton's Estate, tested the constitutionality of a statute
declaring property acquired in Montana to be community property
upon entering California and held section 164 unconstitutional:
If the right of a . . . citizen of California, as to his separate
property, is a vested one and may not be impaired or taken by
California law, then to disturb in the same manner the property
right of a citizen of another state, who chances to transfer his
domicile to this state, bringing his property with him, is clearly
to abridge the privileges and immunities of the citizen.'
Similarly, the California Legislature enacted Probate Code sec-
tion 201.5 to achieve the same result as at the death of the title-
holding spouse. Probate Code section 201.5 provided:
Upon the death of either husband or wife one-half of all per-
sonal property, wherever situated, heretofore or hereafter ac-
quired after marriage by either husband or wife, or both, while
domiciled elsewhere, which would not have been the separate
property of either if acquired while domiciled in this state, shall
belong to the surviving spouse, . . . subject to the debts of the
decedent and to administration and disposal under the provision
of Division 3 of this code.
This section purported to give the deceased, non-title holding
spouse the power of testimony disposition over the "quasi-commu-
nity" property of the other spouse. This Probate Code section was
6. CAL. CIV. CODE § 164 (1917) provided:
All other property acquired [not classified as separate under §§ 162 and 163]
after marriage by either husband or wife, or both, including real property situ-
ated in this state and personal property wherever situated, acquired while domi-
ciled elsewhere, which would not have been the separate property of either if
acquired while domiciled in this state, is community property.
7. 1 Cal. 2d 1, 33 P.2d 1 (1934).
8. Id. at 5, 33 P.2d at 3.
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declared unconstitutional in Paley v. Bank of America.' The court
found that to take the vested, separate property rights of the title-
holding spouse and expose the property to the unilateral testamen-
tary action of the other spouse would be to strip a living person of
his sole and separate property. This result was condemned as uncon-
stitutional in line with the court in Thornton's Estate.
In 1961, the Legislature enacted Civil Code section 146 which
required equal division of community and quasi-community property
between the spouses at divorce, except under limited circumstances.10
The California Supreme Court in Addison v. Addison" held this
statute constitutional because it did not deprive a property right of
the owner of quasi-community property without due process. The
court found that the protection of the innocent party's rights in mari-
tal property provided a legitimizing state interest. "We are of the
opinion that where the innocent party would otherwise be left un-
protected[,] the state has a very substantial interest and one sufficient
to provide for a fair and equitable distribution of marital property
without running afoul of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. "12
B. Section 5120.12018
Current section 5120.120 is really a classification statute.1
4
Classification of property in the community property system estab-
lishes specific property rights and defines the property's liability for
debts. It provides that any property, held in the name of either
spouse, which would have been community property if the couple
had acquired the property while domiciled in California is classified
9. 159 Cal. App. 2d 500, 324 P.2d 35 (1958).
10. CAL. CIV. CODE § 146 (West 1961) provided:
In case of the dissolution of the marriage by decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction or in the case of judgment or decree for separate maintenance of the
husband or wife without dissolution of the marriage, the court shall make an
order for disposition of the community property and the quasi-community prop-
erty ...as follows:
(b) If the decree be rendered on any other ground than that of adultery, incur-
able insanity or extreme cruelty, the community property and quasi-community
property shall be equally divided between the parties.
CAL. CiV. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1988) is substantially the same.
11. 62 Cal. 2d 558, 399 P.2d 897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1965).
12. Id. at 567, 399 P.2d at 903, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
13. See Appendix.
14. A classification statute defines the nature of property within the community property
system. The classification occurs at the time of property acquisition.
[Vol. 28
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as community property for the purposes of debt collection.
C. Public Policy Considerations Surrounding Section 5120.120
The state interest cited to legitimize the classification of quasi-
community property as community property is the need to promote
"the sharing of common obligations[;] . . .[to] help insure equal ac-
cess to credit by both spouses[;] and [to] protect California creditors
who extend credit in reliance on the availability of marital assets to
satisfy debts.""'
Statutes that reallocate the ownership of vested property rights
in marital property have been found to be constitutional only at the
time of death of the title-holding spouse and at the time of divorce.
The cases cite the need to ensure an equitable division of property as
the compelling interest. 6
D. The Problem of Section 5120.120's Retroactivity
When the Legislature enacted the 1984 amendments to the
Civil Code, 7 it made them retroactive. Retroactivity of community
property statutes is a hotly debated and highly controversial compo-
nent of California's Civil Code. 8 In 1976, the California Supreme
Court decided that, in some instances, it is not unconstitutional to
give a statute retroactive effect. In re Marriage of Bouquet' in-
volved the retroactive application of an amendment to a prior statute
prescribing that earnings acquired by the husband during periods of
separation were community property while earnings accumulated by
the wife were her separate property. The Legislature judged that the
prior situation unconstitutionally discriminated against the husband;
it enacted a new statute, at issue in Marriage of Bouquet, treating
both spouses equally.
The Bouquet court set out an analysis for determining when it
is constitutionally permissible for a statute to be applied retroac-
15. 17 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 12 (1984).
16. See In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427
(1976); Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 399 P.2d 897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1965).
17. See Appendix.
18. See Reppy, Retroactivity of the 1975 California Community Property Reforms, 48
S. CAL. L. REV. 977 (1975); Note, Retroactive Application of California's Community Prop-
erty Statutes, 18 STAN. L. REV. 514 (1966); In re Marriage of Fabian, 41 Cal. 3d 440, 715
P.2d 253, 224 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1986); In re Marriage of Buol, 39 Cal. 3d 751, 705 P.2d 354,
218 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1985); Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427
(1976).
19. 16 Cal. 3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1976).
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tively. First, there must be a sufficiently important government inter-
est. Second, the retroactive application of the statute must be an im-
portant component to subserve the government's interest. Finally, the
court looks to the degree of reliance placed on the statute, the legiti-
macy of that reliance, and the extent to which the retroactive appli-
cation of the statute would disturb those interests. 0
The court found in Bouquet that Mrs. Bouquet's due process
rights had not been violated due to the strong state interest in ensur-
ing an equitable division of marital property at divorce. It was the
importance of the state interest which allowed the Legislature to ap-
ply the statute retroactively.
In 1985, the court reaffirmed this analysis in In re Marriage of
Buol.21 Buol considered the constitutionality of retroactively requir-
ing a writing to overcome the presumption that property held in
joint tenancy is community property. The court found the retroactive
application of Civil Code section 4800.1 impaired the vested rights of
Mrs. Buol. The court determined there to be a compelling state in-
terest: the equitable distribution of marital property at divorce. Yet,
the court found that retroactive application of the statute did not
subserve the state's acknowledged interest in the equitable distribu-
tion of marital assets at divorce. The statute cures "no rank injus-
tice" as in the Bouquet case.22
Thus, the court created a fourth prong to the analysis: "these
cases [Addison and Bouquet] support the proposition that the state's
paramount interest in the equitable dissolution of the marital part-
nership justifies legislative action abrogating rights in marital prop-
erty where those rights derive from manifestly unfair laws."2
Therefore, the retroactive application must serve to eradicate an un-
just prior law.
Finally, In re Marriage of Fabian4 again reaffirmed the Bou-
quet/Buol test for retroactivity in a case testing the constitutionality
of applying section 4800.2 retroactively. Section 4800.2 provides a
waivable statutory right of reimbursement when a spouse contributes
separate property to a community asset. Before this statute was en-
acted, In re Marriage of Lucas2" held that such a contribution is
20. Id. at 592, 546 P.2d at 1376, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
21. 39 Cal. 3d 751, 705 P.2d 354, 218 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1985).
22. Id. at 761, 705 P.2d at 360, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
23. Id.
24. 41 Cal. 3d 440, 715 P.2d 253, 224 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1986).
25. 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980).
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considered a gift unless an agreement to the contrary can be shown.2
In Fabian, the court found that there was no discernible state
interest in retroactive application, except an unexplainable desire to
overrule Lucas.2
7
III. IMPACT OF THE CREDITORS' RIGHTS STATUTES ON DUE
PROCESS AND POLICY
There are two separate and distinct due process problems
presented by Sections 5120.020 and 5120.120. First, the sections at-
tempt to divest a spouse of his or her quasi-community property
rights without benefitting the title-holding spouse in any way,
thereby violating due process. Second, the statutes purport to be ret-
roactive, one of the community property system's most significant
constitutional problems.
A. Due Process and Divestment of Quasi-Community Property
Interests
The system of statutes enacted in 198428 purports to reclassify
quasi-community property as community property for debt collection
purposes. Classification of property as separate, community or quasi-
community is critical to the determination of whether the property is
liable for debts."'
Classification of property takes place at the time of acquisi-
tion." California courts have long struggled with the question of
when and why marital property may be reclassified. Quasi-commu-
nity property is treated as the separate property of the title-holding
spouse during the marriage. Only at the death of the title-holding
spouse or dissolution of the marriage is quasi-community property
treated as community property.
Thornton's Estate"1 involved the attempt by the Legislature to
reclassify quasi-community property as community property simply
because Mr. and Mrs. Thornton moved to California. The court
firmly and unequivocally held that it is a violation of due process for
26. d. at 815, 614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
27. Fabian, 41 Cal. 3d at 448-49, 715 P.2d at 258, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
28. See Appendix.
29. Community property is liable for all debts incurred by either spouse during mar-
riage. CAL. CiV. CODE § 5120.140. Separate property is liable for its owner's debts and for the
necessities of life for the non-title-holding spouse. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 5120.130, 5120.140
(West Supp. 1988).
30. Fabian, 41 Cal. 3d 440, 715 P.2d 253, 224 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1986).
31. 1 Cal. 2d 1, 33 P.2d 1 (1934).
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California to take separate property rights"2 from one spouse and
expose that property to liability for community debts as a result of
the simple relocation of a couple's domicile.
The court found property rights of the title-holding spouse to be
vested. Since the separate property rights were vested, they could
only be disturbed if the court found there to be a sufficient govern-
ment interest and the government interest could not be served except
by the divestment of the property rights. This analysis will be fol-
lowed below.
1. Vested Rights in Quasi-Community Property
The definition of vested property rights has changed over time.
Before 1965, the label "vested property right" had special signifi-
cance. Once the court had determined that the rights were vested,
they were constitutionally protected."3 A study conducted of pre-
1965 cases, identifying property rights as either vested or non-vested,
showed that judges attached the term after evaluation of the impor-
tance of the rights. This determination was made by subjecting the
value of the rights to a reasonableness standard. Judges used a
purely subjective standard to make this determination. 4
After a judge decided that the right was or was not vested, he or
she merely stated this fact in the opinion rather than articulating
factors to consider in making the determination. Therefore, no guid-
ance was given to lower courts in making the same decision in later
cases.33 For example, Thornton's Estates6 held that the rights of the
title-holding spouse were vested, and the opinion followed the norm
of merely stating a conclusion. The court failed to analyze why the
rights were vested and simply stated:
So long as we are bound by the holding that to limit the right of
one spouse by increasing the right of the other in property ac-
quired by their united efforts is the disturbance of a vested
right, we entertain no doubt of the application of at least two
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
32. The term "separate property" is used to denote the treatment of quasi-community
property during the existence of the marital community. The separate property acquired dur-
ing marriage by a married person which would have been community had it been acquired in
California may eventually be treated as quasi-community property at death or divorce.
33. Reppy, supra note 18, at 977.
34. Reppy, supra note 18, at 977.
35. Reppy, supra note 18, at 977.
36. 1 Cal. 2d 1, 3, 33 P.2d 1, 3 (1934).
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the United States.8 7
However, since the 1965 decision of Addison v. Addison,38 the
courts have continued to use the term vested rights, but the meaning
is different. Now the term is used when the court sees the property
right as one that it determines there is a duty to recognize and pro-
tect. 9 The court looks to the legitimacy of the right and to the reli-
ance the individual or society has placed on the property right at
issue.
In comparing Thornton's Estate and Addison, it is clear that
quasi-community property rights are vested. Thornton's Estate
squarely holds that the rights are vested while Addison talks in
terms of the importance of the rights. While Addison does not hold
that the title-holding spouse's rights are vested within this definition,
it seems clear that the court intended that the rights be considered
vested.
2. The State Interest and Alternatives
In order for the Legislature to divest one spouse of a vested
property right, the Legislature must identify a sufficient state inter-
est.4 0 The interest must be so fundamental and important to the state
as to justify the taking of a citizen's property to serve the greater
good of society.
The California Law Revision Commission found the state in-
terest attained by this legislation to be the promotion of the sharing
of assets and liabilities between married persons, equal access to
credit and protection of California creditors. The legislation is also
intended to help assure equal access to credit by both spouses and to
protect California creditors who extend credit in reliance on the
availability of marital property to satisfy debts."'
The Commission also asserts that treating quasi-community
property as community property for debt collection purposes does not
pose any significant constitutional problems."2 The Commission jus-
tified this position by saying that the policy considerations are "so
fundamental as to outweigh the possible impairment of private prop-
erty rights." '43
37. Id.
38. 62 Cal. 2d 558, 399 P.2d 897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1965).
39. Id. at 566, 399 P.2d at 902, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
40. Id. at 558, 399 P.2d at 897, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 97. See supra section IIA.
41. 17 CAL. L. REVIsION COMM'N REPORTS 12 (1984).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 12 n.14.
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However, as will be shown, the state interest enunciated by the
Law Revision Commission is not sufficient to legitimize the taking of
a non-debtor spouse's separate property. The California courts have
identified only a narrow state interest sufficient to justify reclassifica-
tion of marital property rights. Reclassification occurs only at disso-
lution of the marriage or death of the title-holding spouse and exists
to ensure an equitable distribution of assets acquired during the
marriage.' At death and divorce, this overriding concern protects
children and the less economically secure spouse from an inequitable
allocation of assets which would otherwise leave them financially
unprotected.
The court determined that the state's interest in reallocating
marital property rights at death and divorce is particularly important
due to the state's special stake in the marital relationship. In Addi-
son, the court cites United States Supreme Court precedent:
Each state as a sovereign has a rightful and legitimate concern
in the marital states of persons domiciled within its borders.
The marriage relation creates problems of large social impor-
tance. Protection of offspring, property interests, and the en-
forcement of marital responsibilities are but a few of the com-
manding problems in the field of domestic relations with which
the state must deal.' 5
Addison takes hold of this interest and finds it sufficient enough
to divest a spouse of his or her property. The Addison court distin-
guishes Thornton's Estate and identifies an important line of demar-
cation between them. The court finds:
The legislation under discussion [Cal. Civ. Code § 146], unlike
old section 164, makes no attempt to alter property rights
merely upon crossing the boundary into California. It does not
purport to disturb vested rights "of a citizen of another state,
who chances to transfer his domicile to this state, bringing his
property with him. . . ." Instead, the concept of quasi-commu-
nity property is applicable only if a divorce or separate mainte-
nance action is filed here after the parties have been domiciled
in California. Thus, the concept is applicable only if, after ac-
quisition of domicile in this state, certain acts or events occur
which give rise to an action for divorce or separate maintenance.
These acts or events are not necessarily connected with a change
44. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 399 P.2d 897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1965); CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 101 (West 1988); CAL. CIVIL CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1988).
45. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d at 567, 399 P.2d at 902, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 102 (quoting Wil-
liams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942)).
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of domicile at all."6
Therefore, the court delineates two possible scenarios involving
the divestment of property rights: one which is permissible and one
which is not.
Reclassification is permissible only when, after moving to Cali-
fornia, "certain acts or events occur" which lead to a dissolution of
the marriage. Courts have held fast to the position that death and
dissolution of marriage are the only times quasi-community property
can be treated as community property without violating the title-
holding spouse's due process rights. In other words, only the compel-
ling state interest of protecting the other spouse, which uniquely oc-
curs at death or divorce, is sufficient to reallocate vested property
rights.
The state interest articulated by the Law Revision Commission
is simply not sufficient to permit the Legislature to divest the title-
holding spouse of his or her property rights.
The state interest in protecting members of the marital commu-
nity, children and society at dissolution involve fundamental rights of
the ex-spouse and children to receive protection from the possibility
of a severe and debilitating reduction in the ability to obtain food,
clothing and shelter. Society's stake is less dramatic, but its moral
obligation to provide a minimum standard of living for all citizens is
great.The interests proferred by the Law Revision Commission are
much less compelling. They focus on collateral needs in our society.
The first goal-to promote the sharing of marital assets and liabili-
ties between married couples-is already achieved by less intrusive
means. At divorce or death, both spouses receive an equal share of
the community and quasi-community property. 7 Therefore, protec-
tion of the spouses exists at the end of the marital community. Safe-
guards also exist during the existence of the marital community. The
Civil Code provides protection by making each spouse personally lia-
ble for debts incurred by the other spouse for the necessaries of life."
The second goal-to promote equal access to credit for married
persons-is not sufficient to warrant the reallocation of marital
property. Acquisition of credit is not necessary to obtain the basic
requirements of life. Although credit is helpful in today's society, it
46. Id. at 566, 399 P.2d at 901-02, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 102-03 (citation omitted).
47. CAL. PROB. CODE § 101 (West 1984); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(a) (West Supp.
1988).
48. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5120.140(a)(1) (West Supp. 1988).
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is more a luxury than a necessity.
The third goal-protection of creditors-is also not adequate to
support the divestment of marital property rights. The creditors do
not need the benefit of this social welfare legislation. They should be
required to evaluate the risks associated with extending credit to the
community based on the signature of one spouse. They have the
power to verify the assets owned by the community and the debtor
spouse to determine whether they will benefit from their bargain. As
rational decision makers, creditors should be hesitant to extend credit-
if they believe the potential of receiving a high rate of return is not
worth the risk of dealing with only one spouse.
Specifically, creditors can require both spouses to sign a promis-
sory note; thereby making them' both personally liable for the debt.
Having both signatures exposes all of the community property and
all of the separate property estates of both spouses to liability for the
debt. Thus, the creditor has the benefit of all possible assets from
which to satisfy the debt.
From a due process standpoint, the result of taking the non-
debtor spouse's property without providing him or her with any ben-
efit was declared unconstitutional in Paley v. Bank of America."9 In
Paley, the deceased wife attempted to dispose of half of her surviving
husband's quasi-community estate by will. The Court of Appeal
found that the deceased wife did not have the power to divest "a
living person of his sole and separately owned property, by [her] tes-
tamentary action . . . having no interest of any kind therein.""0 The
court found that the property owned, which would have been com-
munity had they been domiciled in California, was the sole and ab-
solute property of the husband and his wife "had no interest in it
whatever, expectant or otherwise.""1 The court held that to allow the
wife to dispose of her husband's separate property by will, simply
because she and her husband moved to California, would be uncon-
stitutional as it "stripped" a living person of one-half of his separate
property.52
The result, which the Court of Appeal held unconstitutional, is
the taking of a spouse's property without consideration. Current
Civil Code section 5120.120 similarly "strips" a living person of his
separate property rights. The section allows the debtor spouse to en-
cumber the non-debtor spouse's quasi-community property and ex-
49. 159 Cal. App. 2d 500, 324 P.2d 35 (1958).
50. Id. at 503, 324 P.2d at 38.




poses that property to liability for community and separate debts.
The unilateral action of the debtor spouse is permitted to divest the
non-debtor spouse of his separate property rights for which he re-
ceives no consideration.
Therefore, it is clear that the state interests articulated by the
Law Revision Commission are inadequate to support the reclassifi-
cation of quasi-community property as community property. Only
the narrow situation of divorce may justify this action on the part of
the Legislature. This situation is not present in these statutes nor are
the same kinds of important interests present here.
B. Policy Considerations
The reasons which may be advanced53 by the proponents of sec-
tion 5120.120 will not survive California's due process analysis. 5'
The first justification for treating quasi-community property as com-
munity property for debt collection purposes may be the concept of
equitable subordination. 5 Equitable subordination is usually applied
in the context of shareholder loans to corporations. The equitable
doctrine allows non-shareholder creditors of the corporation to sat-
isfy their debts from the corporation's assets before shareholders are
allowed to collect on their loans. The doctrine identifies the share-
holders' debt as inferior to that of an outside creditor. The same may
hold true to an extent in a marital community. It may be justifiable
to treat a third party creditor's right as superior to that of the non-
debtor spouse. The creditor has extended credit and detrimentally
relied upon the existence of community assets to repay the debt. The
53. The California Law Revision Commission does not set out its analysis for enacting
this statute. The points raised in this section are arguments that the author believes a propo-
nent would make for the enactment of CAL. CiV. CODE § 5120.120.
54. See supra section III for California's community property due process analysis.
55. Equitable subordination is also known as the Deep Rock Doctrine. It is named for
the famous United States Supreme Court case, Taylor v. Standard Gas Co., 306 U.S. 307
(1939). Taylor involved a corporate reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act in which Stan-
dard Gas and Electric made loans to its subsidiary, Deep Rock Oil. When Deep Rock Oil
subsequently filed for bankruptcy, the parent company submitted a claim to the receiver, as did
other creditors, under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. The Supreme Court subordinated
the parent company's claim in favor of the other creditors because Standard Gas was responsi-
ble for Deep Rock's problems. Standard Gas contributed to these problems by mismanaging
and improvidently granting loans, thus converting Deep Rock into a mere instrumentality for
Standard's own purposes. Standard thereby benefitted, at least indirectly, by the manner in
which Deep Rock was operated.
This is similar to the community property context in which the nondebtor spouse benefits
by the debtor spouse incurring debt from which the nondebtor is exempt.
The Deep Rock Doctrine has been reaffirmed by other courts such as the Second Circuit
in Security and Exchange Commission v. S. & P. Nat'l. Corp., 360 F.2d 741 (2d Cir. 1966).
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subordination of the non-debtor spouse's rights is fair because the
risk of debt default should rest primarily with the community and its
members rather than on the creditor.
However, equitable subordination is infected, to a degree, with
the same constitutional infirmity that the Paley court found unconsti-
tutional. Section 5120.120 prefers the creditor's claim over the vested
property rights of the non-debtor spouse. A vested property right is
entitled to constitutional due process protection which it does not re-
ceive under this statute. Paley determined that exposing the non-
debtor's property to liability for debts during his lifetime without his
consent and by the unilateral action of the debtor spouse is
unconstitutional.56
Another argument which may be advanced in favor of section
5120.120 is that it treats a marital union as a general partnership.
An important aspect of a partnership is that each partner is an agent
for the other."' The California Corporations Code allows one part-
ner to encumber all the partnership assets as well as the personal
assets of the other partner. 8 Using the partnership analogy, it is
legitimate to allow one spouse to encumber all the community assets
as well as the quasi-community estate of the other spouse. The credi-
tor should be permitted to rely on the partnership relationship to
satisfy the debt extended to the community out of the community
assets, the separate estate of the debtor spouse, and the quasi-com-
munity property of the non-debtor spouse. This arrangement does
56. Paley v. Bank of America, 159 Cal. App. 2d 500, 506, 324 P.2d 35, 39 (1958).
57. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15009 (West Supp. 1988) provides in pertinent part:
(1) Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business,
and the act of every partner, including the execution in the partnership name of
any instrument, for apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the
partnership of which he is a member binds the partnership, unless the partner
so acting has in fact no authority to act for the partnership in the particular
matter, and the person with whom he is dealing has knowledge of the fact that
he has no such authority. For purposes of this subdivision, "knowledge" in-
cludes constructive notice pursuant to Section 15010.7.
(2) An act of a partner which is not apparently for carrying on of the business
of the partnership in the usual way does not bind the partnership unless author-
ized by the other partners.
(4) No act of a partner in contravention of a restriction on authority shall bind
the partnership to persons having knowledge of the restriction.
58. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15015 (West 1977) provides:
All partners are liable
(a) Jointly and severally for everything chargeable to the partnership under
Sections 15013 and 15014.
(b) Jointly for all other debts and obligations of the partnership; but any
partner may enter into a separate obligation to perform a partnership contract.
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
not encumber as great a base of assets as could be encumbered by a
general partner.5 ' If the marital community were treated the same as
a general partnership, in terms of liability for debt, the debtor spouse
would be allowed to expose the non-debtor spouse's separate, quasi-
community, and community estates to liability for debt.
However, this analogy does not withstand analysis. In a general
partnership, a partner may only bind the partnership if he has ap-
parent authority to do so. 60 The other partners can prevent partner-
ship liability by notifying creditors that the partner does not have the
authority to bind the partnership.61 In the case of section 5120.120,
the non-debtor spouse has no power to prevent the other spouse from
encumbering the property. Additionally, an agent can only bind the
principal to the extent of his authority.'3 If the title holding spouse
does not give such authority to the other spouse to encumber his/her
property, any action by him/her should be void.
C. Due Process and the Retroactivity Issue
The California Supreme Court established an analysis for de-
termining whether a statute which, when retroactively applied, abro-
gates vested property rights thereby violating due process. The test
consists of four parts: (1) there must be a sufficient government in-
terest; (2) retroactive application of the statute must be an important
component in achieving the state's interest; (3) the court must deter-
mine the degree of reliance placed on the statute and the legitimacy
of that reliance; and, (4) the retroactive application must serve to rid
the state of an unjust law.63
When enacting section 5120.120, the California Law Revision
Commission found the state interest to be threefold: to promote the
sharing of assets and liabilities between married persons, to ensure
equal access to credit, and to protect California creditors. As dis-
cussed above, this state interest is likely not sufficient to warrant the
abrogation of the vested property rights of the title-holding spouse.
However, assuming for the sake of argument that the interest is suf-
59. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15009 (West Supp. 1988) provides that a general partner can
encumber all partnership assets, all of the debtor partner's personal estate, and all of the non-
debtor partner's estate.
60. Id. § 15009(1).
61. Id.
62. CAL. CiV. CODE § 2315 (West 1985) provides: "An agent has such authority as the
principal, actually or ostensibly, confers upon him."
63. See supra section lID; Fabian, 41 Cal. 3d 440, 715 P.2d 253, 224 Cal. Rptr. 333
(1986); Buol, 39 Cal. 3d 751, 705 P.2d 354, 218 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1985); Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d
583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1976). Prong 4 is generally analyzed with prong 2.
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ficient, it will be seen that the other prongs of the test cannot be met.
1. The Importance of the Retroactivity Component
The court found in both Buol and Fabian that the state interest
was not advanced by the retroactive application of the statute be-
cause the new statutes did not do away with any injustice present in
the previous law. Buol dealt with section 4800.1 which required a
writing to overcome the presumption that property held in joint ten-
ancy is community property. The old position, that an oral agree-
ment would overcome the presumption, was not inherently discrimi-
natory nor did it violate any other constitutional guarantee.
Fabian involved the retroactive application of section 4800.2.
Section 4800.2 gives a spouse, contributing separate property to im-
prove a community asset, a right of reimbursement. Previously, such
a contribution was considered a gift to the community.64 In enacting
section 4800.2, the Legislature articulated no state interest except a
vague desire to overrule previous case law."' In Bouquet, the court
relied heavily on the fact that the old statute was blatantly unconsti-
tutional as it denied the constitutional right of equal protection to
husbands by treating earnings acquired by them during separation
as community property while treating those of their wives as sepa-
rate property.
In this situation, quasi-community property has been treated as
separate property for all purposes except at the dissolution of the
marital community either by the death of the title-holding spouse or
by divorce. The California courts have consistently insisted that this
is the proper treatment of California marital property.66 Therefore,
there is no "rank injustice" nor is the status quo manifestly unfair.
There is no objective defect in the prior treatment of quasi-commu-
nity property which makes the retroactivity component unimportant
in the overall statutory scheme.
2. Reliance and its Legitimacy
The California Supreme Court's test requires that reliance on
the property interest and its legitimacy be low in comparison to the
state interest served by the retroactive legislation.
In the case of these statutes, by contrast, the reliance on the
64. In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980).
65. Fabian, 41 Cal. 3d at 448-49, 715 P.2d at 258, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
66. See Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 399 P.2d 897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1965); In re Thorn-
ton's Estate, I Cal. 2d 1, 33 P.2d 1 (1934).
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property right is high. The courts have found that quasi-community
property rights are vested rights.67 When property rights are vested,
the person holding title to the property relies on the fact that he or
she cannot be deprived of those rights without due process of law. In
the past, the California courts have consistently and unequivocally
held that quasi-community property is to be treated as the separate
estate of the spouse holding title until death or divorce. The reliance
on this consistent and unchanging position is indeed great and legiti-
mate. The highest court in California has insisted upon this position
since the early days of its history. The courts have thwarted all ef-
forts by the California Legislature to abrogate these rights by strik-
ing down as unconstitutional any such legislation."8 Due to this le-
gitimate reliance, this prong of the. retroactivity analysis cannot be
met.
IV. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
This section will discuss the less burdensome alternatives which
are available to the Legislature that both meet the policy goals an-
nounced by the Law Revision Commission and avoid the constitu-
tional and policy infirmities present in the current statutes.
A. Text of Proposed Statute
California Civil Code section 5120.120 is amended to read:
(a) The following property shall be subject to liability for debts
incurred by a member of the community:
(1) the community property;
(2) the separate property of a spouse who is personally liable
for the debt;
(3) the "quasi-community" property estate of any spouse per-
sonally liable for debt;
(4) property which was classified as community property in an-
other community property state; and
(5) the "quasi-community" property of the non-debtor spouse to
the extent that the acquisition of credit benefits the community.
(b) There is a presumption affecting the burden of proof that
debts incurred by either spouse during marriage for consideration
benefit the community.
(c) The presumption is rebuttable by the spouse contesting the
67. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 399 P.2d 897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1965); Thornton's Es-
tate, 1 Cal. 2d 1, 33 P.2d 1 (1934).
68. See supra section II.
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liability of his/her "quasi-community" estate.
(d) Whether the debt incurred, benefits the community is a
question of fact. The contesting spouse must show by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the debt did not benefit the community.
(e) The definition of "benefit to the community" within the
meaning of this section is the same as that found in California Civil
Code section 4800(d).
(f) This section applies to debts incurred on or after the effec-
tive date of this statute.
B. Advantages of the Proposed Statute
The proposed amendment to section 5120.120 provides that
quasi-community property is liable only for the separate debts in-
curred by the spouse holding title to the quasi-community property
and for debts beneficial to the community incurred by either spouse.
This limitation on liability would be less onerous because the spouse
with title to the property would be guaranteed a benefit. The title-
holding spouse can encumber his or her quasi-community property
or the non-title-holding spouse can encumber the other's quasi-com-
munity property; either way, the title-holder benefits. As the statute
now stands, separate debts of the non-title holding spouse can be
satisfied from the quasi-community fund of the nondebtor spouse.
The nondebtor spouse is not guaranteed any benefit in exchange for
the liability of his or her property.
California Civil Code section 4800(d) 9 makes a distinction at
dissolution as to whether a specific debt benefits the community.
Debts incurred which do not benefit the community are to be as-
signed without offset to the spouse who incurred those debts. Conse-
quently, there is already a provision built into the community prop-
erty statutes which discriminates and finds important the distinction
between debts that benefit the community and those that do not.
The proposed amendment to section 5120.120 would satisfy the
state interest announced by the Legislature. The proposed statute
would provide for the sharing of marital assets and liabilities by
making the quasi-community property liable for community debts.
The quasi-community property can be attached for all debts which
are of benefit to the community and all debts for which the title-
69. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(d) (West Supp. 1988) states that "In]otwithstanding subdi-
vision (c), all separate debts, including those debts incurred by a spouse during marriage and
before the date of separation that were not incurred for the benefit of the community, shall be
confirmed without offset to the spouse who incurred the debt."
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holding spouse is personally liable.
The proposed statute also would provide equal access to credit
for spouses because each can pledge quasi-community property for
the repayment of debts incurred for the benefit of the community.
Each spouse has the ability to receive credit based on his or her sep-
arate estate, the community estate, and the quasi-community estate
to the extent that the credit is for the benefit of the community.
Amended section 5120.120 would also protect the rights of cred-
itors by providing a greater base of assets from which they may sat-
isfy debts, but not at the expense of the non-debtor spouse's owner-
ship rights. The section gives creditors rights in property which, in
all fairness, should be liable for the debt, and the section saves the
creditor from having to make an expert determination of the classifi-
cation of marital property.
The proposed statute represents a compromise between the old
position, which did not allow creditors access to the quasi-commu-
nity property, and the current statute which exposes the quasi-com-
munity estate to liability for all debts for which the community prop-
erty is liable.
In addition, the proposed amendment to section 5120.120 would
not violate the due process clause. The proposed amendment would
guarantee the title holding spouse a benefit in exchange for his/her
property's exposure to liability. His/her "quasi-community prop-
erty" estate would be liable only for debts which he or she, as title-
holding spouse, should be liable. The proposed section would not
expose his/her property to liability for the separate debts of the
other spouse. Amended section 5120.120 provides liability only for
those debts from which the title holding spouse has directly or indi-
rectly benefitted. Therefore, there is no "taking" of his/her property.
Although the proposed statute would subordinate the rights of
the non-debtor spouse to those of the creditor, the new section allows
this result only when it is fair and equitable. The community and
the title-holding spouse have received value through the extension of
credit. The non-debtor spouse's rights are not "subordinated" in the
strict sense. The non-debtor spouse is only required to repay a debt
for which he is morally, and now, legally liable. If he were not re-
quired to repay the creditor, the community could hide behind the
title of the property to shield it from a creditor's attack. This would
be an inequitable and unfair result. It would primarily burden the
creditors, and would also injure society by potentially creating higher
interest rates and consequent difficulties in obtaining credit.
The proposed amendment to section 5120.120 would also avoid
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the major problem in Paley. In Paley, the crux of the difficulty was
that the predeceased wife attempted to take her husband's property
and give it away by will. The transfer was purely gratuitous provid-
ing the community with no benefit. The deceased wife attempted to
divest her living spouse of the enjoyment of his property. This pro-
posal provides that the quasi-community property is liable only
when there is consideration for the title-holding spouse's liability.
The amendment would not allow the debtor spouse to gratuitously
transfer the property without benefit to the community, and the pro-
posed section does not make the non-debtor spouse liable for the sep-
arate debts of the debtor spouse.
Therefore, the compromise suggested above is sound from the
standpoint that the proposal would satisfy the policy goals, but
would not unconstitutionally take the non-debtor spouse's property.
V. RECONCILIATION OF THE POLICY OBJECTIVES
The major policy objective of the debt collection statutes is to
provide for the rights of creditors in community property. The stat-
utes are meant to provide the creditor with certainty when dealing
with married couples. The proposed amendments to the statutes
would continue that premise but would balance the rights of credi-
tors with the property rights of the spouses.
The amended statute would provide creditors with rights in the
community property but would not wholly deprive the community
members of their individual property rights. The proposed statute
would allow creditors to rely on legitimate expectations that commu-
nity property, and to some extent quasi-community property, will be
available to satisfy debts. Neither proposed statute would displace a
creditor's rights in order to enhance the rights of the community
member.
In addition, the proposed statute meets the policy objectives
enunciated by the current statutes. The amended section 5120.120
would provide for the protection of California creditors as it would
expose a greater base of assets to liability for debt collection pur-
poses. The proposed section would provide for the sharing of com-
munity assets and liabilities between the spouses as the amended sec-
tion would make the non-debtor spouse's "quasi-community" estate
liable for debts from which he or she directly benefits. Proposed sec-
tion 5120.120 would also enhance the credit opportunities for the
non-title holding spouse by allowing him or her to encumber the
"quasi-community property" of the other spouse to the extent that




Providing creditors with rights in community property is an im-
portant legislative goal, but that goal must be weighed against the
property rights of the spouses. The California Law Revision Com-
mission's purpose in advocating the enactment of sections 5120.020
and 5120.120 was to enhance the rights of creditors in marital prop-
erty and to encourage financial equality between the spouses. Prior
to the enactment of this section, quasi-community property was
treated as separate property and, therefore, not liable for community
debts.
Sections 5120.120 and 5120.020 impact due process rights and
present important policy concerns. These problems can be remedied
by enacting the proposed amendments to the sections. Amending sec-
tion 5120.120 to expose quasi-community property to liability only if
the debt is a benefit to the community avoids the due process
problems of the current statute by providing the title-holding spouse
with consideration in exchange for the liability of his property.
The amendment represents a compromise between the polar po-
sitions of the old and current statutes. The proposed amendment to
the statute enacts the spirit of the policy goals, avoids the constitu-
tional infirmities present in the current statute, and does not defeat
legitimate property interests of the community members or creditors.
APPENDIX
In order to provide a frame of reference for the two statutes, it
is helpful to examine the provisions of the entire sequence of debt
collection statutes enacted in 1984.
A. Liability of Community Property: Section 5120.110
CAL. CIV. CODE § 5120.110 provides:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, the com-
munity property is liable for a debt incurred by either spouse
before or during marriage, regardless of which spouse has the
management and control of the property and regardless of
whether one or both spouses are parties to the debt or to a judg-
ment for the debt.
(b) The earnings of a married person during marriage are not
liable for a debt incurred by the person's spouse before mar-
riage. After the earnings of the married person are paid, they
remain not liable so long as they are held in a deposit account
in which the person's spouse has no right of withdrawal and are
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uncommingled with other community property, except property
insignificant in amount. As used in this subdivision, "deposit
account" has the meaning prescribed in Section 9105 of the
Commercial Code, and "earnings" means compensation for per-
sonal services performed, whether as an employee or otherwise.
This section makes community property liable for premarital
debts of either spouse. However, the earnings of the non-debtor
spouse may be shielded under the new statute only by deposit in a
separate account. This narrows the protection of the non-debtor
spouse. Formerly, the non-debtor spouses were protected to the ex-
tent that property could be traced to his or her earnings.
B. Liability of Quasi-Community Property: Section 5120.120
This section is analyzed in detail in the text.
C. Liability of Separate Property: Section 5120.130
CAL. CIv. CODE § 5120.130 provides:
(a) The separate property of a married person is liable for a
debt incurred by the person before or during the marriage.
(b) Except as otherwise provided by statute:
(1) The separate property of a married person is not liable
for a debt incurred by the person's spouse before or during a
marriage.
(2) The joinder or consent of a married person to an en-
cumbrance of community property to secure payment of a debt
incurred by the person's spouse does not subject the person's
separate property to liability for the debt unless the person also
incurred the debt.
This section clarifies the liability of a spouse's separate property
for debts of the community. Generally, only personal debts may be
satisfied from one's separate estate. Therefore, the debts of the other
spouse, incurred before or during marriage, may not be satisfied
from the separate property of the non-debtor spouse.
D. Liability for Necessaries: Section 5120.140
CAL. CIV. CODE § 5120.140 provides:
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 5120.130, a mar-
ried person is personally liable for the following debts incurred
by the person's spouse during marriage:
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(1) A debt incurred for necessaries of life of the person's
spouse while the spouses are living together.
(2) Except as provided in Section 5131, a debt incurred for
common necessaries of life of the person's spouse while the
spouses are living separately.
(b) The separate property of a married person may be applied
to the satisfaction of a debt for which the person is personally
liable pursuant to this section. If the separate property is so ap-
plied at a time when nonexempt community property is availa-
ble but not applied to the satisfaction of the debt, the married
person is entitled to reimbursement to the extent the property
was available.
This new section resolves some of the ambiguities surrounding
former California Civil Code Section 5121's requirement that the
non-debtor spouse's separate property is liable only for community
necessaries. The new statute makes the non-debtor spouse liable for
the necessaries of life while the spouses are living together and for
common necessaries of life while the spouses are living separate and
apart without a formal agreement regarding the payment of
expenses.
However, California Civil Code Section 5131, which protects a
married person's separate estate from liability for common neces-
saries of life when the parties are living separately by agreement, is
unaffected by the new statute. The new section exposes the married
person's assets to liability without even making him or her a judg-
ment debtor as required by former section 5121.
E. Liability for Support Obligation: Section 5120.150
CAL. CIV. CODE § 5120.150 provides:
(a) For the purpose of this chapter, a child or spousal support
obligation of a married person that does not arise out of the
marriage shall be treated as a debt incurred before marriage,
regardless whether a court order for support is made or modi-
fied before or during marriage.
(b) If community property is applied to the satisfaction of a
child or spousal support obligation of a married person that
does not arise out of the marriage, at a time when nonexempt
separate income of the person is available but is not applied to
the satisfaction of the obligation, the community is entitled to
reimbursement from the person in the amount of the separate
income, not exceeding the community property so applied.
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(c) Nothing in this section limits the matters a court may take
into consideration in determining or modifying the amount of a
support order, including, but not limited to, the earnings of the
spouses of the parties.
The Legislature repealed California Civil Code sections 5127.5
and 5127.6 which limited the availability of community property for
support obligations of children and former spouses. The new section
clearly identifies a child or spousal support obligation as a prenup-
tial debt for which separate property is primarily liable. The Law
Revision Commission felt that the old law was inequitable because it
did not give children and former spouses the same rights as creditors
in the community property. 17 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N. RE-
PORTS 19 (1984).
F. Liability of Property after Division: Section 5120.160
CAL. CIV. CODE § 5120.160 provides:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, after di-
vision of community and quasi-community property pursuant to
Section 4800:
(1) The separate property owned by a married person at
the time of the division and the property received by the person
in the division is liable for a debt incurred by the person before
or during marriage and the person is personally liable for the
debt, whether or not the debt was assigned for payment by the
person's spouse in the division.
(2) The separate property owned by a married person at
the time of the division and the property received by the person
in the division is not liable for a debt incurred by the person's
spouse before or during marriage, and the person is not person-
ally liable for the debt, unless the debt was assigned for pay-
ment by the person in the division of the property. Nothing in
this paragraph affects the liability of property for the satisfac-
tion of a lien on the property.
(3) The separate property owned by a married person at
the time of the division and the property received by the person
in the division is liable for a debt incurred by the person's
spouse before or during marriage, and the person is personally
liable for the debt, if the debt was assigned for payment by the
person in the division of the property. If a money judgment for
the debt is entered after the division, the property is not subject
to enforcement of the judgment and the judgment may not be
enforced against the married person, unless the person is made
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a party to the judgment for the purpose of this paragraph.
(b) If property of a married person is applied to the satisfaction
of a money judgment pursuant to subdivision (a) for a debt in-
curred by the person that is assigned for payment by the per-
son's spouse, the person has a right of reimbursement from the
person's spouse to the extent of the property applied, with inter-
est at the legal rate, and may recover reasonable attorney's fees
incurred in enforcing the right of reimbursement.
The new section reverses prior case law which permitted a
creditor to obtain payment for a debt by attaching the former com-
munity property distributed to the non-debtor spouse. Under the
new section, a creditor may satisfy his/her debt only from property
distributed to the debtor spouse-rather from any traceable former
community property.
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